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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-2a-3 (2). (e) . 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Should the Court uphold the uncounseled conviction of 
Appellant when the trial court imposed no actual or suspended 
sentence of incarceration, but instead demanded of him only time 
served, which time would have been required of him no matter what 
sentence the trial court mandated? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Constitutional issues . . . are questions of law that [the 
Court] review[s] for correctness." Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 
1185 (Utah 2004); see also State v. Bvinqton, 936 P.2d 1112, 1115 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) . 
"Application of statutory law to the facts presents a mixed 
question of fact and law. [The Court] review [s] the [trial] court's 
findings for clear error and its conclusions of law for correctness 
. . . ." In re G.B., 53 P.3d 963, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
U.S. Const, amend. VI. See Appellant's Addendum A. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12. See Appellant's Addendum B. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301. See Appellant's Addendum C. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-302. See Appellant's Addendum D. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Rory Curry, Defendant/Appellant, received a citation for 
intoxication on November 19, 2004, R. 1, faced arraignment on 
December 2, 2004, R. 4, and participated in a pretrial conference 
on January 6, 2005. R. 10-11. He was tried and convicted on January 
20, 2005, R. 14-15, and this appeal followed. 
Late on the night of November 18, 2005, Officer Andrew Cox, of 
the Roosevelt City Police Department, responded to a possible 
burglary at the residence of a Roy Jepson. R. 40:8. When Officer 
Cox arrived at the scene, he witnessed Defendant and others 
attempting to flee from Mr. Jepson' s home. R. 40:8. Officer Cox and 
other peace officers repeatedly asked them to stop and Defendant 
eventually did. R. 40:9. 
When Officer Cox spoke with Defendant, he detected "a strong 
odor of alcohol," R. 40:9, and he observed that Defendant's "speech 
was very slow and slurred." R. 40:9. In addition, Defendant, who 
was lying down at the time of Officer Cox's conversation with him, 
R. 40:10, required assistance both to stand up and to proceed to 
the police vehicle. R. 40:10. 
Although no one was charged with burglary as a result of the 
call, Defendant was cited for intoxication shortly after midnight 
on November 19, 2005, R. 1; R. 40:10-11, because the officers 
believed he posed a threat "to himself [and] others." R. 40:11. 
After all, Defendant repeatedly returned to Mr. Jepson's residence, 
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though he was asked not to, and "broke a window when he was there.'' 
R. 40:11. Moreover, Defendant was physically impaired and he "had 
no where [sic] to go [on] that [frigid] night." R. 40:11. 
Just a matter of hours after his arrest, Defendant "bailed 
out" of jail (at 8:25 a.m. on November 19th). R. 40:2; R. 2-3. 
"[Defendant] was[, however,] on probation and [his probation 
officer] . . . got [him]," R. 40:2, and took him back into custody 
for alleged probation violations. R. 40:5. Indeed, probation 
officials were able to secure "a no bail warrant." R. 40:20. (The 
case for which he was on probation was "an assault by a prisoner 
case." R. 40:20.) 
At his arraignment in this case, Defendant pleaded not guilty, 
and he opted not to change his plea at the pretrial conference. R. 
40:2,5-6. It was at the pretrial hearing that Defendant, the court, 
and Ms. Barton-Coombs addressed the issue of counsel. R. 40:6. 
Defendant asked the court if he "c[ould] . . . talk to Ms. Coombs." 
R. 40:6. The court inquired if Ms. Barton-Coombs had been retained 
by Defendant in the case, R. 40:6, prompting Ms. Barton-Coombs to 
ask the court if she had been "appointed." R. 40:6. The court 
replied: "No, this is a Class C. I wouldn't have appointed you," R. 
40:6, and then informed Defendant that if Defendant wanted Ms. 
Barton-Coombs to represent him, he needed to "make arrangements to 
pay her." R. 40:6. She appeared amenable. R. 40:6. 
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When the trial arrived, however, Ms. Barton-Coombs did not 
attend, and Defendant proceeded pro se. R. 15. Plaintiff presented 
its evidence, Defendant invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to 
testify, the court found Defendant guilty, and the court, with 
Defendant's consent, moved on to the issue of sentencing. R. 40:19. 
During the ensuing discussion, the court discovered that Defendant 
had been incarcerated since November 19, 2004 on a no bail warrant 
for a probation violation, R. 40:20, and that Defendant had "dried 
out" while in jail. R. 40:21. The court expounded on the pitfalls 
of alcoholism, encouraged Defendant to seek treatment, and then 
announced Defendant's sentence. R. 40:21-22. 
Defendant received a sentence of time served and six months 
probation. R. 40:22. The "terms of the probation" were that 
Defendant attend three Alcoholics Anonymous meetings weekly and 
that he not consume alcohol. R. 40:22-23. The court then noted that 
Defendant had a probation violation hearing later that day. R. 
40:23. Finally, the court determined that "under the 
circumstances[,] [it] [would not] impose a fine." R. 40:23. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Constitution of the United States, the Utah Constitution 
and Utah statutes all confer the right to counsel upon indigent 
defendants in cases involving incarceration. The purpose of these 
provisions is to prevent defendants from losing their liberty when 
they did not benefit from the aid of an individual familiar with 
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the intricacies of criminal law. A sentence of time served does not 
implicate this policy, because a defendant sentenced to time served 
spends no more time in jail than he or she would have if victorious 
at trial. Consequently, there is no deprivation of liberty as a 
result of the sentence. 
In this case, Defendant completed his sentence of time served 
before his trial and the six-month term of probation (unaccompanied 
by any suspended sentence) , which was also a part of his sentence, 
is no longer extant. While Defendant did spend a number of weeks in 
jail as a result of a no bail warrant, based upon unspecified 
probation violations which are not a part of the record before the 
Court, Defendant spent only a matter of hours in jail for the 
intoxication charge that led to his conviction, and he served all 
of that time before his trial. His conviction should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
NEITHER FEDERAL NOR STATE LAW ENTITLED DEFENDANT TO 
COUNSEL FOR HIS MISDEMEANOR INTOXICATION CONVICTION, WHEN 
HE RECEIVED A SENTENCE OF TIME SERVED, AND THAT 
CONVICTION SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
"Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article 1, section 12, of the Utah Constitution guaranty an 
indigent defendant the right to counsel. This right[, however,] 
attaches in misdemeanor cases [only] where a deprivation of liberty 
may ensue . . . ." State v. Vincent, 845 P.2d 254, 256 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) (citation omitted) . Likewise, Utah Code Section 77-32-
301(1) mandates appointed counsel only when a defendant "faces the 
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substantial probability of the deprivation of the indigent's 
liberty," and Utah Code Section 77-32-302(1) provides for counsel 
"if the indigent is under arrest for or charged with a crime in 
which there is a substantial probability that the penalty to be 
imposed is confinement in either jail or prison." 
In assessing the right to counsel, therefore, this Court 
applies "an after-the-fact test that requires a reviewing court to 
find an uncounselled misdemeanor conviction constitutional when the 
defendant was not sentenced to jail." Lavton City v. Lonqcrier, 943 
P.2d 655, 658 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Similarly, under Utah statute, 
a "defendant . . . [who] [i]s not sentenced to a jail term . . . 
[is] not . . . entitled to appointed counsel." City of St. George 
v. Smith, 828 P.2d 504, 505 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Thus, the question naturally becomes whether a sentence of 
time served amounts to a jail sentence for constitutional and 
statutory purposes. At least two courts have found that it does 
not. 
In Nicholson v. State, 761 So. 2d 924, 931 (Miss. Ct. App. 
2000), the defendant received a "sentence . . . [of] M 8 hrs. in 
jail Time Served.'" "Upon pleading guilty," the court wrote, ". . 
. Nicholson did not receive any further prison or jail time." Id. 
Hence, the court concluded, "[n]o jail term was imposed." JEd. A few 
years later, the tribunal once again confronted the issue, and, in 
harmony with its earlier ruling, opined: "The record supports the 
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conclusion that [the defendant] received no further jail time after 
having pled guilty. Pretrial incarceration is of no consequence." 
McLaurin v. State, 882 So. 2d 268, 272 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). 
Even more recently, the Supreme Court of South Carolina 
arrived at a like determination in the case of Glaze v. State, 
26049 (October 17, 2005). In that case, " [the defendant] was an 
indigent defendant and had neither waived his right to counsel nor 
been afforded counsel by the state. He had spent ten days in jail 
awaiting trial because he could not post bail." Id. Reflecting the 
concern in the instant case, the Glaze Court framed the issue it 
adjudicated as "whether an indigent defendant convicted of a 
misdemeanor is unconstitutionally denied the right to counsel if he 
is sentenced to time served after neither waiving his right to 
counsel nor being provided counsel by the state." Id. The court 
"h[e]ld that he [wa]s not." Id. 
• In explanation, the jurists averred that the defendant's 
theory, that a sentence of time served necessitated that he have 
counsel, "would do nothing to prevent uncounseled losses of 
liberty. For example," the court noted, "if [the defendant] had not 
been sentenced to time served, but rather to a fine, . . . . [a] 
fine for an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is perfectly valid 
. . . . [And, the defendant] still would have spent those ten days 
in jail." Id. Moreover, the court observed, "[t]he reason that [the 
defendant] spent ten days in jail [wa]s he was charged with a 
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misdemeanor and could not post bail. He was subjected to no period 
of confinement as a result of his uncounseled . . . conviction, so 
his time-served sentence did not violate the constitution." Id. 
Likewise, in the instant case, Defendant's conviction did not 
result in any jail time he would not have otherwise served. What is 
more, the extended period Defendant spent behind bars stemmed not 
from his arrest in the instant case, but from a no bail warrant for 
alleged violations of his probation in another case. R. 40:2,5,20. 
Indeed, Defendant "bailed out" of jail a matter of hours after his 
arrest on the incarceration charge. R. 40:2; R. 2-3. Nevertheless, 
the trial court, cognizant, among other things, of Defendant's 
testimony that he "dried out," R. 40:21, while incarcerated, opted 
to sentence him to time served, R. 40:22, and chose, "under the 
circumstances[,] . . . [not to] impose a fine." R. 40:23. 
Though the trial court required no post-conviction jail time 
of Defendant, Defendant nonetheless asserts that he should have 
received counsel, because the "had [he] not spent . . . [the time 
he did] in jail, there was a substantial probability that he would 
have been incarcerated." Appellant's Br. at 7. There is no reason, 
however, for the Court to engage in a hypothetical analysis. If the 
trial court had imposed a sentence of incarceration, Defendant 
would have had a right to counsel, but those are not the facts 
before this Court. Defendant did not receive any more time in jail 
than he would have received if he had been found not guilty. As 
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importantly, the facts indicate that, from the outset, it was not 
the trial court's intention to imprison Defendant. After all, in 
replying to Ms. Barton-Coombs inquiry as to whether she had been 
appointed in the case, the court stated: "No, this is a Class C. I 
wouldn't have appointed you." R. 40:6. 
In sum, Defendant asks "th[is] [C]ourt to reverse his 
conviction in this case [for all purposes] on the grounds that he 
should have been appointed counsel to represent him under the 
federal and state constitutions and Utah statutory law." 
Appellant's Br. at 7. As noted above, however, in gauging the 
constitutionality and statutory appropriateness of a conviction, it 
is the sentence of incarceration, and not the conviction, in and of 
itself, that is critical. Otherwise, there would be a right to 
counsel in every misdemeanor case. 
When an actual jail term is imposed or a suspended jail term 
is imposed, the convict faces the certainty or the solely-
conviction-based possibility of post-conviction incarceration. This 
is not the situation with a sentence of time served. As noted in 
Glaze, like a defendant who receives a sentence of a fine, a 
defendant sentenced to time served will not spend one more day in 
jail than he or she would have if exonerated at trial. 
This Court could, of course, rule that a fine is the only 
sustainable sentence for an uncounseled misdemeanant. This result, 
however, is unnecessary, as a sentence of time served does not, to 
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any greater degree, tread upon the aim of the right to counsel, 
which is to avert sentences of post-conviction incarceration when 
defendants do not have the benefit of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff, Roosevelt City, requests 
that the Court affirm the trial court's decision, upholding 
Defendant's conviction for intoxication. 
DATED this / { ' day of November, 2005. 
ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellee 
. McClellan 
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